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Utah Code Annotated § 7 8-2 7 - I I (] 953): 
hi I offer in writing to pay a particular sum 
of money or to deliver a written instrument 
for specific personal property, is, if not 
accepted, equivalent to the actual production 
and tender of the money, instrument or 
property. 
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to the money, instrument, or property, or he 
is deemed to have waived it; and, if the 
objection is to the amount of money, the 
terms of the instrument c r the amount or 
kind of property, he must specify the 
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or 
be precluded from objection afterwards, 
1 Jtah a :>« le Annotat .ed § : 8 - 2 7-56 (] 9 5 3) i 
In civil actions, where not otherwise 
provided by statute or agreement, the court 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
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that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in 
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with the court a proposed order, judgment or 
decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(b) copies of the proposed Findings, 
Judgments, and/or orders shall be served on 
opposing counsel before being presented to 
the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections 
thereto shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within five (5) days after service. 
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Third Judicial District Court Rules of Practice, Rule 
4(a)-(b) are identical to Rules of Practice for the 
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, Rule 
2.9(a)-(b), cited above. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Great Equity Life Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Great Equity") is liable to 
appellants for further costs and fees after making a good 
and valid tender of its full liability on November 7, 1983. 
2. Whether Great Equity is liable to appellants 
for attorney's fees when the issue was not raised at the 
trial level and where there is no legal basis for such an 
award. 
3. Whether Great Equity was entitled to a sati-
sfaction of judgment after having paid funds to General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation pursuant to a garnishment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company (hereafter 
Great Equity) concurs in the Statement of Facts provided 
by Plaintiff s, General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(hereafter GMAC) and adds the following facts relating to 
activities following the defendants1 second attempt to 
appeal the case on October 13, 1983. 
On November 7, 1983, Great Equity, through their 
counsel, Mr. William J. Hansen, sent a letter to counsel 
for GMAC, Mr. Jay Barney and counsel for defendants, Mr. 
Mark Miner, tendering payment of the principal and interest 
due according to the decisions of the District Court and 
of the Utah Supreme Court in General Motors Acceptance 
1 
Corporation v. Martinez. 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983), 
(R-535-539) (R-647-652, Exhibit A, herein). A check for 
$6,135.36, representing the full amount of the principal 
($4,717.50), plus interest at the rate of 14.55 percent 
from September 30, 1981, was included with a letter to Mr. 
Barney. Payees on the check were GMAC, Jay Barney, Hector 
Martinez, Manuel Rivera, and Mark Miner (R-648). The 
letter requested Mr. Barney to sign off on the check and 
then forward it to the defendants for their acceptance, 
conditional upon a satisfaction of judgment (R-647). The 
intent of the tender was to pay Great Equity's liability 
in full and terminate the running of interest against it 
(R-641-645). Enclosed with the letter of tender to Mr. 
Miner was a check for $742.85, representing tender of the 
costs of court awarded by the Supreme Court (R-647, 652). 
These costs were determined by the memorandum of Mr. Miner 
and were approved by the District Court (R-540-542, 
584-585). 
After signing off on the check for principal and 
interest, Mr. Barney attempted to present it to Mr. 
Miner for his acceptance. Mr. Barney specifically informed 
Mr. Miner on November 16, 1983, that he was free to 
reserve his rights relative to attorney's fees, the only 
issue then pending before the courts, in signing the 
satisfaction of judgment accompanying the check (Exhibit 
C, herein, pending submission to the record). Mr. Barney 
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also sought other occasion to present the check to Mr. 
Miner (R-650). 
Mr. Miner rejected both the tender of costs and the 
tender of principal and interest without objection or even 
comment to either Mr. Barney of Mr. Hansen. Consequently, 
Mr. Barney returned the check to Mr. Hansen on November 
28, 1984, noting that efforts had been made to have Mr. 
Miner execute the check in order to cut off Great Equity's 
liability for the principal and interest, but that Mr. 
Miner had declined to do so (R-650) . No reasons for the 
rejection or objections to the tender were made by Mr. 
Miner until the hearing on Great Equity's objection to Mr. 
Miner's proposed judgment, held June 16, 1986. 
On December 12, 1985, the Utah Supreme Court filed 
a per curiam opinion dismissing defendants' appeal (R-607). 
The Court noted that there had been no final order that 
disposed of all the issues as to all the parties from 
which defendants could take an appeal. Rather, defendants 
had attempted to appeal an interlocutory ruling concerning 
GMAC's judgment against defendants and the award of 
additional attorney's fees to GMAC. Notably, the Court 
affirmed that no appeal had been taken from GMAC's judgment 
against defendants in Martinez, and that the Court had 
only decided the third-party judgment against defendants. 
On February 5, 1986, following remittitur of the 
case to the District Court (R-606), GMAC filed a motion to 
3 
enter final judgment, establish payment rights, award 
attorney's fees and justify certain bonds (R-613). 
However, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify Judge 
Conder for bias and prejudice on February 6, 1986 (R-616) . 
This motion was denied by the Honorable Philip Fishier on 
March 7, 1986 (R-634). 
Judge Conder, upon hearing, subsequently ordered 
counsel for defendants, Mr. Mark Miner, to prepare a 
judgment in accordance with the Supreme Court's rulings 
(R-637). The proposed judgment prepared by Mr. Miner was 
objected to by Great Equity on the grounds that it would 
award attorney's fees to defendants and against Great 
Equity, and would award interest to defendants beyond 
November 7, 1983, the date of tender of principal and 
interest to defendants. These matters had never been 
ruled on by the court. 
A hearing was held June 16, 1986, wherein the Court 
denied defendants' claim of attorney's fees against Great 
Equity as having no legal basis and ordered that the 
November 7, 1983 tenders of principal, interest and costs 
to defendants was valid and cut off Great Equity's liabi-
lity for interest after that date (R-688-690) . Mr. Miner 
was asked by the Court to prepare the order and judgment, 
but he refused. Mr. Barney thereafter prepared the order 
and judgment. 
The subsequent judgment of the Court, appealed 
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here, dated June 23, 1986, granted judgment for GMAC and 
against defendants for $4,717.50, together with interest 
at the rate of 14.55 percent A.P.R., until fully paid and 
costs of $127.00 and attorney's fees of $3,500.00. It 
then granted judgment for defendants and against Great 
Equity for $4,717.50, together with interest at the rate 
of 14.55 percent A.P.R. until November 7, 1983 and costs 
of $742.85 and no attorney's fees. The judgment finally 
provided that any payment of Great Equity to GMAC would 
constitute a satisfaction to the extent thereof of GMAC's 
judgment against Great Equity (R-694-696). 
On June 24, 1986, GMAC issued a writ of garnishment 
to Great Equity for the amount of its judgment to the 
defendants as provided in the judgment (R-709-712) . Great 
Equity answered and paid this garnishment on June 26, 
1986, totaling $6,925.95 (R-702, 703). In evidence of 
this payment, Judge Conder entered an order of satisfaction 
of judgment, dated June 26, 1986, for the full amount of 
the judgment against Great Equity (R-697, 698). A partial 
satisfaction of judgment for $6,925.95 was also entered as 
to GMAC's judgment against the defendants on June 23, 1986 
(R-699-700). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Great Equity delivered to GMAC and defendants a 
letter and check constituting tender on November 7, 1983, 
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representing full payment of Great Equity's liability to 
all parties in this action. Defendants rejected this 
tender without any objection, thus waiving any future 
objections as to the amount, kind, or conditions of 
tender. The tender was valid as an offer to pay the full 
amount due on a specific obligation determined by the 
court. Great Equity lawfully and, of necessity, condi-
tioned receipt of tender on a satisfaction of judgment 
signed by defendants. Defendants were free to reserve 
their rights of appeal on issues then pending before the 
court. Defendants are estopped from claiming that tender 
was ineffective because no final judgment had been entered, 
since defendants had the undeniable responsibility to 
prepare and present such judgment to the court. Proper 
tender to defendants discharged Great Equity's responsi-
bility for interest and costs after November 7, 1983. 
Great Equity is not responsible for the attorney's 
fees of any other party in this action. Defendants waived 
any right to attorney's fees by their failure to raise the 
issue until after the case had been remanded by the 
Supreme Court. Further, defendants failed to plead, 
prove, or argue any facts which would provide any legal 
basis for attorney's fees. The basis of bad faith now 
argued by defendants must fail because they have failed to 
meet the statutory requirements for establishing their 
claim, and have cited no legal basis on which they may 
6 
recover fees. Further, defendants cannot establish a 
claim for attorney's fees because Great Equity has not 
exercised bad faith in this action. 
The execution of judgment granted below by means of 
garnishment of Great Equity was completely proper and 
lawful. The notice and procedural steps taken by the 
parties and the court were in accordance with the rules of 
law. The law does not require judgment creditors to give 
preference to bonds in the execution of their judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDING AND JUDGMENT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT GREAT EQUITY MADE GOOD AND VALID TENDER 
OF ITS FULL LIABILITY TO GMAC AND DEFENDANTS 
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1981, THUS CUTTING OFF ITS 
LIABILITY FOR INTEREST AND COSTS. 
A. Defendants Waived Their Objections to Tender 
by Their Failure to Offer Any Objections At 
the Time of Tender. 
Counsel for Great Equity tendered full payment of 
its liability for judgment and costs in its checks and 
letter of November 7, 1983, to counsel for GMAC, Mr. Jay 
Barney and defendant, Mr. Mark Miner (R-647-648, 652, 
Exhibit A, herein). This letter in itself constitutes 
tender under Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-1 (1953), which 
states: 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum 
of money or to deliver a written instrument 
for specific personal property, is, if not 
accepted, equivalent to the actual production 
and tender of the money, instrument or 
property. 
The letter notified Mr. Miner that a check had been drawn 
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and was being forwarded to him. Mr. Miner made no objec-
tion to this letter. The Honorable Dean E. Conder found 
and ordered that this tender was valid and that Great 
Equity had no responsibility for interest to defendants 
after that date (R-690). 
Actual tender to Mr. Miner was also effectuated by 
Great Equity through the actions of Mr. Barney (Exhibit C, 
herein, pending submission to the record). Mr. Barney 
attempted to make tender to Mr. Miner but was rebuffed by 
Mr. Miner without objection to the amount or kind of 
tender. Mr. Barney wrote Mr. Hansen on November 28, 1984: 
"Efforts were made to have Mr. Miner and his clients 
execute the check that the question of principal and 
interest accrued might be resolved to cut off the liability 
of [Great Equity]. This the defendants have declined to 
do" (R-650, Exhibit B, herein). 
Mr. Miner was offered the opportunity to object to 
tender. A standard satisfaction of judgment and release 
was included with the tender letter and check (See R-647, 
Exhibit A, herein). Defendants were free to sign condi-
tional upon the reservation of their rights with respect 
to the issues and on appeal between GMAC and defendants. 
The letter of Mr. Barney to Mr. Miner, dated November 16, 
1983 further made this clear to Mr. Miner: 
[Mr. Hansen] has indicated that he would 
have no objection to drawing a release that 
would satisfy the principal and interest due 
and owing under the contract to [GMAC] and 
8 
reserve the issue relative to attorney's 
fees for further determination on appeal 
(Exhibit C, herein, pending submission to 
the record). 
The ability of a party accepting tender to reserve 
his rights to litigate and appeal issues still pending is 
clearly recognized in Utah. This Court has stated the 
rule of law: 
Generally, when a judgment creditor accepts 
payment and executes a satisfaction of 
judgment the controversy becomes moot and 
the right of appeal is barred. However, the 
general rule does not necessarily prevent an 
appeal as to separate and independent claims 
if it is shown that a controversy remains in 
regard thereto. 
Hollinasworth v. Farmers Insurance Co. , 655 P.2d 637, 639 
(Utah 1982) (footnotes omitted). 
In a decision exactly on point, Jensen v. Eddy, 30 
Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973), this Court denied a 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal on the ground that 
plaintiff had voluntarily paid the judgment, which was 
then satisfied. In hearing the appeal, the Court noted 
that the parts of the judgment which were paid and satis-
fied were separate and distinct from the issues presented 
on appeal. In the present action, Great Equity explicitly 
tendered only the principal and interest due and owing 
GMAC under the insurance claim, and the costs of appeal 
awarded by this Court (R-647-650, Exhibits A and B, 
herein; and Exhibit C, pending admission to the record). 
These parts of the action were concretely determined by 
9 
this Court's decision and were not contested by any party 
on the date of tender. Defendants were certainly free to 
accept that tender and cut off both their interest and 
that of Great Equity without possibly hindering their 
rights on the issue of attorney's fees. See Golden Spike 
Equipment Co. v. Croshaw, 16 Utah 2d 391, 401 P.2d 949 
(1965). 
Mr. Miner's refusal of tender without objection 
waived any objections he may have had to its amount or 
terms. Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-3 (1953), states: 
The person to whom a tender is made must, at 
the time, specify any objection he may have 
to the money, instrument or property, or he 
is deemed to have waived it; and, if the 
objection is to the amount of money, the 
terms of the instrument or the amount or 
kind of property, he must specify the 
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or 
be precluded from objection afterwards. 
Under these terms, the defendants are precluded from 
asserting that the amount or terms of tender were in-
adequate. Thus, all of defendants' arguments in this 
appeal as to the effectiveness and validity of the November 
7, 1983 tender are improper and untimely. 
B. Good and Valid Tender Was Made to GMAC 
and to Defendants. 
Without waiving its claim that defendants' arguments 
against tender should be rejected by the Court, Great 
Equity will address the merits of defendants' objections. 
The tender constituted an offer to pay the full 
amount due on a specific obligation. The Supreme Court 
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decision of May 24, 1983 clearly established the liability 
of Great Equity to pay the benefit under its policy owing 
to GMAC. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (R-536). This amount was 
previously established by the District Court to be 
$4,717.50, with interest from September 30, 1981, at a 
contractual rate of 14.55 percent (R-538, 539). This 
judgment was never appealed as this Court found in its 
December 12, 1985 opinion (R-607). The check of October 2, 
1983, tendered on November 7, 1983, constituted a full 
payment of this liability. 
The tender check and letters were made to the 
proper payees. The Supreme Court decision of May 24, 
1983 firmly established the liability of Great Equity to 
satisfy the policy claim of the defendants to GMAC as 
beneficiary. Great Equity further recognized that, by 
definition, its position as a third-party defendant in the 
action, made it "liable to [the defendants] for all or 
part of the Plaintiff's claim against [the defendants].11 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14(a) (1953). In 
order to properly satisfy its full liability to all 
parties, Great Equity named as payees on the check the 
defendants and their counsel, and GMAC and its counsel. 
The propriety of this action is most evident when 
the alternatives are examined. Had Great Equity paid only 
the defendants, without a satisfaction of judgment from 
GMAC, and the judgment of GMAC was not satisfied thereafter 
11 
by the defendants, GMAC would still have a valid claim 
against Great Equity as a third-party defendant. Great 
Equity was bound to seek a satisfaction from GMAC to 
prevent the possibility of a double payment of its liabi-
lity and a resulting claim against defendants. The same 
argument applies to Great Equity's request for satisfaction 
from the defendants. As established above, defendants had 
notice and were free to modify their satisfaction to 
reserve their rights as to issues still pending. 
Defendants cite purported authority for their 
position that the condition of satisfaction sought by 
Great Equity with its tender invalidated the tender. 
First, as noted above, Great Equity had every right and, 
indeed, the necessity of receiving a satisfaction of 
judgment upon payment of the same. Defendants1 argument 
is tantamount to claiming that a debtor has no right to 
request a receipt and discharge upon payment of a debt to 
his creditor. Such a position is wholly without foundation 
in the law. The cases cited by defendants for this 
proposition, K. & M. , Inc. v. Le Cuyer, 107 Cal. App. 2d 
710, 233 P.2d 569 (1951) and Woods v. Dixon, 193 Or. 628, 
240 P.2d 520 (1952), state a principle that tender must be 
free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a 
right to insist upon. However, defendant can cite no 
authority claiming that a judgment debtor has no right to 
insist on a satisfaction of judgment when tendering 
12 
payment. A satisfaction of judgment is precisely the 
mechanism provided by law to record the payment of a 
judgment and the end of a lawsuit. See, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 58B (1986). 
The remaining authorities cited by defendants are 
inapposite to the issues at hand. The cases of Estate of 
Kohlepp v. Mason, 25 Utah 2d 155, 478 P.2d 339 (1970); 
Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954); and 
Hyams v, Bamberger, 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202 (Utah 1894), 
deal with the issue of tender by check being ineffective 
for lack of sufficient funds. If defendants intend to 
imply that the checks tendered to them were not backed by 
sufficient funds, they would be raising the objection for 
the first time in this action. Thus, it could not be 
considered here on appeal. Trayner v. Cushincr, 688 P.2d 
856 (Utah 1984) ; Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 
2d 301, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). If the defendants do 
not intend to assert this objection, their reliance on 
these authorities is profoundly misplaced. Defendants' 
citation of Radali v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n., 59 Wyo. 
140, 138 P.2d 984 (1943) is inappropriate in that the case 
turns on a Wyoming statute totally inapplicable here. The 
fact remains that defendants have cited no authority 
whatsoever that would allow any legal basis for their 
untimely and erroneous objections to tender. 
Defendants are estopped from asserting that tender 
13 
was ineffective because no final judgment had been entered 
on November 7, 1983. Defendants were responsible, as the 
party obtaining the judgment, to present the final judgment 
to the District Court for its approval and entry. The 
Rules of Practice for the District and Circuit Courts of 
the State of Utah, in effect at the time of remittitur of 
the Supreme Court decision in August of 1983, stated at 
Rule 2.9(a): 
In all rulings by a court, counsel for the 
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen (15) days, or within a 
shorter time as the court may direct, file 
with the court a proposed order, judgment or 
decree in conformity with the ruling.^ 
This codifies and reinforces the well-recognized 
duty of a prevailing party receiving a judgment to prepare 
that judgment for the signature of the judge and entry in 
the record pursuant to Rule 2.9(b). Defendants were 
clearly the party which "obtained the ruling" of a court, 
here the Supreme Court. Further, defendants noted the 
receipt by the District Court of the Supreme Court's 
remittitur when it filed its memorandum of costs on August 
8, 1983 (R-540-542). Defendants failed, however, to 
prepare the judgment directed by the Supreme Court from May 
*Rule 2.9(a) is restated verbatim as the current rule 
in Third Judicial District Court Rules of Practice, Rule 
4(a), effective April 1, 1984. Rule 4 supersedes Rule 2.9 
but restates the pertinent sections referred to here and 
in defendants8 brief verbatim. Defendants1 reference in 
their brief to purported violations of Rule 2.9 are thus 
incorrect in their citation. 
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24, 1983, to April 11, 1986. After the passage of time 
made it clear that defendants were not prepared to dis-
charge their responsibility, and in an attempt to halt the 
continuing accrual of interest, Great Equity tendered the 
full amount of its liability, including costs paid directly 
to the defendants, on November 7, 1983 (R-647-652, Exhibit 
A, herein). 
Based on its responsibility to prepare the judgment, 
defendants are estopped form claiming that the tender 
could not satisfy a judgment which had not been entered. 
In Estate of McFarland v. Holt. 18 Utah 2d 127, 417 P.2d 
244 (1966), this Court found that an executrix was estopped 
from asserting on appeal that her own petition, filed 
without objection, to confirm the sale of certiain estate 
property was insufficient. The Court held: "One who 
files a pleading asking the court to act thereon vouches 
for its verity and should not thereafter be permitted to 
repudiate it for the purpose of upsetting the action the 
court has taken pursuant to his request." The present 
case presents the reverse side of the same issue. One who 
fails to perform his recognized duty as required and 
relied upon by the court and the other parties in the 
action should not thereafter be permitted to rely on his 
neglect to upset the actions of the court and parties to 
remedy his error. To permit such would allow one to 
benefit from his own wrongful omission to act. 
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Defendants1 appeal of October, 1983, did not make 
the tender by Great Equity ineffective. The appeal only 
addressed the grant of attorney's fees to GMAC and the 
judgment between GMAC and defendants. No issue was 
presented in that appeal nor included in the opinion of 
the Supreme Court which would change the liability of 
Great Equity or make the tender invalid. The Supreme 
Court recognized that the only issues on appeal were the 
judgment between GMAC and defendants and the award of 
attorneyfs fees to GMAC (R-607). Likewise, the Amended 
Judgment of September 22, 1983, did not affect the amount 
of judgment between defendants and Great Equity 
(R-579-581). That Amended Judgment dealt only with the 
liability of defendants to GMAC for attorney's fees and 
in no way affected the validity of tender offered by Great 
Equity as determined by the Supreme Court. 
C. Valid Tender Precludes Any Further 
Liability of Great Equity for Interest 
and Costs After November 7, 1981. 
It is settled law in Utah that a tender of payment 
that is rejected discharges interest. Woodmont, Inc. v. 
Daniels, 290 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1961), cited with ap-
proval , Utah County v. Brown, 672 P. 2d 83 n. 9 (Utah 
1983) . Because defendants refused a bona fide tender 
without objection between November 7, 1983 and November 
28, 1984 (the date that the check was returned to Great 
Equity by GMAC, R-650, Exhibit B, herein) defendants may 
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not now claim additional interest accruing from November 
7, 1983. Further, defendants are precluded from objecting 
to the amount or terms of tender by Utah Code Annotated § 
78-27-3 (1953) discussed in Argument I.A., above. 
Great Equity is no longer liable to defendants for 
the costs of trial. In a check dated October 13, 1983, 
Great Equity paid to defendants and their counsel $742.85, 
representing the costs of trial as petitioned by defendants 
and approved by the court (R-540-542, 584, 585; see R-652, 
Exhibit A, herein). Because a valid tender of these costs 
has been made, defendants may not now claim any continuing 
liability of Great Equity for the costs of court. Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-27-3 (1953), discussed above. 
II. GREAT EQUITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A. Defendants have Waived any Possible Right to 
Attorney's Fees Against Great Equity. 
Defendants waived any possible right to a grant of 
attorney's fees by their failure to properly raise the 
issue in the District Court. The appellants third-party 
complaint against Great Equity is completely void of any 
allegation for attorney's fees, under any legal theory 
(R-ll-22). Moreover, there was no evidence presented at 
trial in support of any claim against Great Equity for 
attorney's fees. Likewise, defendants, in their first 
appeal, did not claim that Great Equity was obligated to 
pay any attorney's fees. Defendants first raised the issue 
of its right to any attorney's fees after remittitur of 
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the case to the District Court in August of 1983 (R-553) . 
However, in their appeal of October, 1983, defendants did 
not seek attorney's fees from Great Equity (See R-607). 
In Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983), 
this Court set forth the legal basis for waiver of attor-
ney's fees: 
Preservation of the integrity of the 
adversarial system of conducting trials 
precludes the court from infringing upon 
counsel's role of advocacy. Counsel is 
entitled to control the presentation of 
evidence, and should there be a failure to 
present evidence on a claim at issue, it is 
generally viewed as a waiver of the claim. 
In the instant case, we are not apprised 
of the reason Girard saw fit to rest her 
case without presenting evidence in support 
of her claim for attorney's fees. However, 
even if it be assumed that it was the result 
of oversight, the interests of justice are 
not enhanced when the court exceeds its role 
as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an 
issue that would otherwise be dead, it not 
having been litigated at the time of trial. 
Id. at 247. The present facts are an even more compelling 
case for waiver. In Girard, unlike the present case, the 
plaintiffs at least presented a claim for attorney's fees 
in the pleadings. The defendants here have therefore 
waived any claim for attorney's fees and such claims now, 
at this stage of the proceedings, would be highly pre-
judicial to Great Equity. 
This Court has previously spoken to those who would 
introduce a new theory or doctrine of liability for the 
first time on appeal, which would presumably apply follow-
18 
ing the remand of an appellate decision for entry of 
judgment. The court set forth the following sound policy: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is 
the final settlement of controversies, 
requires that a party must present his 
entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done 
so, he cannot thereafter change to some 
different theory and thus attempt to keep 
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation. 
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 
399, 401 (1970); see Park City v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1978). 
This Court has previously denied an appellant's 
attempt to assert his claim for attorney's fees for the 
first time on appeal. In Trayner v. Cushincr, 688 P.2d 856 
(Utah 1984), the Court denied the appellant's claim 
because he had not presented his basis for fees at the 
time of trial. Here, defendants first made their claim 
for fees even later than the appellant in Travner—after 
the appellate decision had been rendered. If defendants 
believed that they would prevail against Great Equity at 
trial or on appeal, they were bound to raise any claim 
they had for attorney's fees at trial. 
B. There is No Contractual or Statutory Basis 
for Great Equity to Pay Attorney's Fees. 
Without waiving its claim that defendants' arguments 
for attorney's fees should be rejected by the Court, Great 
Equity will address the merits of defendants' arguments. 
Utah law does not permit defendants to recover 
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attorney's fees in this action. "It is well established 
in our law that attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless 
provided for by statute or by contract." B & R Supply 
Co. v. Bringhurst. 28 Utah 2d 442, 444, 503 P.2d 1216, 
1217 (1972); Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). No statute or contract has been 
identified by defendant which would allow recovery of 
attorney's fees here. 
The only contractual basis for any fees in this 
case is the defendants' unilateral promise to pay GMAC's 
costs in enforcing the installment contract. The insurance 
agreement with Great Equity is a totally separate agreement 
between Great Equity and defendants. GMAC is merely a 
third-party beneficiary to the insurance policy. The fact 
that the disability policy was a condition to the install-
ment contract is independent of Great Equity's obligations. 
GMAC's predecessor, Streator Chevrolet, required the 
insurance policy for its own protection. Great Equity had 
no part in the initiation or terms of the installment 
contract. 
The separate nature of the insurance contract, 
apart from the installment contract, is recognized by Utah 
Code Annotated § 31-34-(l) (1953), discussed in this 
Court's prior opinion. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (R-536). 
The requirement for approval and delivery of the insurance 
policy by the insurance company, rather than the creditor, 
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shows the separate nature of the interests of the two. 
The simple fact is that the defendants1 collateral promise 
to pay GMAC's attorney's fees is their personal obligation 
which they voluntarily undertook without regard to whether 
a third party would relieve them of that obligation. 
Even if the insurance contract did expressly or 
impliedly contain an assumption of all of the defendants1 
collateral obligations under the installment contract, 
which it did not, defendants are estopped from asserting 
such a claim under the prior decision in this case. 
Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (R-536). There, this Court held 
that Great Equity was estopped from relying on express 
terms of the insurance contract because the documents 
containing the terms were not delivered to the defendants. 
Id. at 501. This was because the defendants never knew of 
the terms of the policy and could not be bound by something 
they did not agree to. Id. Fairness dictates that this 
argument runs both ways. The appellants cannot now rely 
on express or implied terms of the insurance contract 
which are favorable to them and disregard those terms 
which are not in their favor. Since the defendants never 
knew the terms of the master policy, they cannot claim 
reliance on or expectation of the assumption of their 
collateral obligations. 
C. Defendants Have Presented No Legal Basis for 
the Award of Attorney's Fees. 
Defendants, in their appeal and their arguments to 
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the District Court, appear to rely upon the exception 
which allows the recovery of attorney's fees upon the 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in an insurance contract. This exception is 
stated in a case where this Court specifically held 
against an award of attorney's fees in a case similar to 
the one at bar and relying in part on its prior decision 
here. In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1985), before attorney's fees could be awarded in 
the absence of a statute or contract, the Court held, "it 
must appear that the insurance company acted in bad faith 
or fraudulently or was stubbornly litigious." Id. at 237, 
citing American States Insurance Company v. Walker, 2 6 
Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1971). The Court 
further held that an award of attorney's fees is not 
warranted where the company merely states its position and 
sues for a determination of what appears to be a justici-
able controversy. Farmers. 712 P.2d at 237. 
Each and every authority cited by defendants in 
their brief and below concerns the recovery of attorney's 
fees when the bad faith of the insurer has been estab-
lished. The bad faith of Great Equity has never been 
pled, proven, or raised in any proceeding of this action. 
There are several bases upon which defendants' claim for 
attorney's fees must fail. 
First, defendants have not pled, proven or argued 
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to the District Court the requisite facts and law required 
to establish a claim for attorney's fees, as set forth in 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended): 
In civil actions, where not otherwise 
provided by statute or agreement, the court 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith. 
This section has been interpreted to require that 
specific elements be proven in order to recover attorney's 
fees. Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). There 
must also be a finding of fact of bad faith on the part of 
the insurer before fees may be awarded. Western Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Marchant. 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980). 
Defendants have neither pled nor proven these elements in 
this action. The District Court never made any statement 
or finding that could conceivably imply any bad faith on 
the part of Great Equity. 
Second, defendants' authority cited in its brief is 
entirely inapposite and does not support their position in 
this issue. Defendants rely on Sieael v. William E. 
Bookhultz & Sons, Inc., 419 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 
which is wholly inapposite as a "duty to defend" action 
against an insurer. The court held that the insurer was 
estopped from discontinuing its defense of the insured 
after it had defended the action for one and a half years, 
and that the discontinuance of defense was unreasonable 
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and unjustified, tantamount to bad faith. Further, issues 
of bankruptcy and insured's inability to defend itself 
were at issue. No such situation exists here. 
Defendants1 reliance on Eaan v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Company, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 620 P.2d 141 (1979) 
is likewise misplaced. There, an insurer failed to 
conduct a complete examination of a claim, resulting in 
the denial of benefits. The trial court found a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 
held that when an insurer unreasonably and in bad faith 
fails to pay the claim, there is liability in tort. The 
issue of tort liability for bad faith was pled and proven 
and was decided by the jury. In the case at bar, there 
has been neither pleading nor proof of any tort liability. 
Neither has the issue of bad faith been presented to the 
jury. Nonetheless, defendant supports the reasoning of 
Ecran by citing Dinkinas v. American National Insurance 
Company. 92 Cal. App. 3d 222, 154 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1979), 
which held that insureds may recover the amount of attor-
ney's fees to establish liability under an insurance 
policy. However, defendants fail to note here, as they 
also failed to do below, that this holding in Dinkinas was 
disapproved in Moore v. American United Life Insurance 
Company. 150 Cal. App. 3d 610, 197 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1984). 
There, reviewing California cases concerning the award of 
attorney's fees, the court held that, in the absence of an 
24 
agreement between the parties, attorney's fees would not 
be recoverable in bad faith actions against insurance 
companies, and specifically disapproved Dinkings. Moore, 
197 Cal. Rptr. at 900-901. 
Sukup v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 519, 281 N.Y.S.2d 28 
(1967), cited by defendants below, directly supports the 
position of Great Equity. There, an insurer failed to pay 
a claim under workmen's compensation insurance. The Court 
of Appeals held that the language of the policy allowed 
coverage, and that "all this amounts to is an adverse 
legal controversy between the carrier and insured for 
which no liability for the legal fees of one party would 
be chargeable to the other in the absence of some extra-
ordinary showing." Sukup, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 30. The court 
found that the issue of bad faith had never been pled or 
asserted during trial. Further, there was no evidence on 
the record from which a finding of bad faith could be 
based. Thus, they determined that an insured cannot 
recover attorney's fees in a legitimate controversy with a 
carrier over coverage even though the carrier loses the 
controversy and must pay the claim. 
It would require more than an arguable 
difference of opinion between carrier and 
insured over coverage to impose an extra 
contractual liability for legal expenses . . 
It would be such bad faith in denying 
coverage that no reasonable carrier would . 
. . be expected to assert it. 
Sukup, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 31. This position is the law in 
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Utah under Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 
423, 427 (Utah 1980). Such a situation certainly has not 
been shown by defendants and, indeed, does not exist in 
this action. Martinez. 668 P.2d at 498 (R-536). 
Finally, defendants cannot establish a claim for 
attorney's fees because Great Equity has not exercised bad 
faith in this matter. An insurer is entitled to challenge 
claims on the basis of debatable facts without being found 
in breach of its obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 58:1; 58:8. This has been 
reaffirmed by this Court in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. 
Call, 712 P.2d 231, 237-238 (Utah 1985), discussed above. 
No issue was raised nor was evidence presented to the jury 
which would indicate the lack of good faith and fair 
dealing on the part of Great Equity. Nowhere in the 
decisions of either this Court in Martinez or the District 
Court is there any intimation of a lack of good faith and 
fair dealing on the part of Great Equity. See, Espinoza 
v. Safeco Title Insurance Company, 598 P. 2d 346 (Utah 
1979) (proponent must raise and prove a breach of duty of 
good faith to recover attorney's fees). 
Great Equity's legal position at trial and the 
prior appeal meets the standard of a bona fide question 
about its legal obligations. This is borne out by the 
findings of the jury, the ruling of the trial court, and 
the 3-2 decision of the Court in the initial appeal. A 
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frivolous position for these purposes is one having "no 
legal basis." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. A claim should not 
be labeled as "frivolous" merely because it ultimately 
does not prevail. 
There is no bad faith in merely relying on an 
express term in a contract. Although Great Equity was not 
allowed to rely on the exclusionary term, the Court in the 
prior appeal apparently assumed that the clause was 
otherwise valid and enforceable. Martinez, 668 P.2d at 
501 (R-536). The Court also noted that the estoppel arose 
as a matter of law, thus negating the possibility of some 
factual basis that could have put Great Equity on notice 
of the possibility of estoppel. Id. at 502. 
There is no indication that Great Equity intended 
to hinder, delay or defraud anyone. The defendants 
emphasize that Great Equity did not deny coverage until 
eight months after the disability began. This fact is not 
established in the record and is meaningless in any event 
because GMAC had agreed to delay filing suit on the debt 
until Great Equity had completed its investigation. 
Martinez, 668 P.2d at 500 (R-536). Thus, the defendants 
were in no increased danger of loss because of the delay. 
Great Equity further submits that every party has a 
duty to mitigate damage when a breach of duty occurs. 
Defendants1 counsel agreed with Judge Conder that defen-
dants were individually in default and were liable on the 
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installment contract notwithstanding the existence of an 
insurance contract (R-521-525). When the breach of the 
installment contract occurred, defendants were liable. 
This is the conclusion of law of the District Court 
(R-537-538). In accordance with their duty to mitigate 
losses, they should have tendered full performance to 
GMAC, then proceeded against Great Equity for their losses 
in having to perform. Had they tendered performance, GMAC 
would not have incurred the expenses in issue in this 
suit. Thus, only two parties would have had the expenses 
of one round of litigation, instead of three parties 
bearing the expense of two rounds of litigation: "To the 
extent the damages sustained are the result of the party's 
failure to exercise such care and diligence, he cannot 
recover." DeBry & Hilton Travel Services, Inc. v. Capitol 
International Airways, Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978) 
(footnote omitted). 
III. SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT BY GARNISHMENT IS A PROPER 
METHOD OF EXECUTION AND WAS PROPERLY EXECUTED HERE. 
Defendants have raised as an issue here the 
propriety of the garnishment employed to partially execute 
the June 23, 1986, Amended Judgment. The garnishment was 
paid by Great Equity on June 26, 1986. While this was the 
same day that defendants1 "Notice of Intent to Appeal" was 
filed in the court, Great Equity had not received any such 
notice at the time payment was made to GMAC to satisfy the 
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judgment as ordered and approved by the District Court. In 
any case, such a "notice" provides no notice of an actual 
appeal and has little, if any, effect. 
Defendants imply in their Statement of Issues 
Presented on Appeal (Appellants' brief at p.l) that the 
District Court erred in not requiring GMAC to execute on 
the bonds in the file before executing by garnishment 
against Great Equity. Such an allegation, of course, has 
no foundation whatsoever in the law. Defendant neither 
cites any authority for his proposition, nor can he. The 
issue seems to be so obvious that no significant litigation 
has occurred on the subject since the law only debates 
legitimate and realistic issues. Bonds are clearly only a 
security device and have never been elevated in the law to 
receive preference as a method of execution generally. 
Only in a situation where the law of a contract between 
specific parties governs would such a limitation be placed 
on a judgment creditor. (Great Equity assumes for these 
purposes, but does not concede, that the bonds referred to 
by defendants are or ever were actually valid and capable 
of execution.) 
Due to their total failure to mention the issue of 
satisfaction of judgment through the bonds at any time 
prior to this appeal, defendants have waived their right 
to appeal this issue. While the continuing validity of 
the bonds has been argued below, at no time have defendants 
29 
intimated that the bonds must be the primary source of 
execution by GMAC. The issue was never mentioned or 
decided by the District Court, As discussed above, 
Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); Simpson v, 
General Motors Corp.. 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970); 
and a host of other decisions prevent defendants from 
raising this issue for the first time here. 
The method of execution employed to satisfy the 
judgment of the District Court followed appropriate 
procedure as prescribed in the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rule 69 allows for execution of a judgment by a 
writ of execution "unless the court otherwise directs." 
Rule 64D(a) (ii) provides a writ of garnishment as an aid 
to satisfy a money judgment. Nowhere in Rules 64A or 64D 
is there any requirement that notice be given to a judgment 
debtor prior to service on a garnishee. Prior notice is 
only required under Rule 64A for prejudgment writs of 
garnishment, which does not apply here. Consequently, the 
procedures employed here were proper contrary to defen-
dants » obj ections. 
Defendant claims the District Court violated Rule 
2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah in its June 1986 allowance of 
garnishment without notice to defendants. First, Rule 2.9 
is an improper citation of the rule defendant advances, as 
discussed in footnote 1 above. Second, Rule 4(b) of the 
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Third judicial District Court Rules of Practice, which 
does state defendant's rule, applies explicitly only to 
proposed orders, judgments, or decrees of the court. A 
writ of garnishment does not fall under the auspices of 
the Rule. Therefore, the District Court could not possibly 
have violated the Rule. 
Defendants also claim that the satisfaction order 
of the District Court was improper because it was entered 
without notice to the defendants. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 58B(b) (1986) authorizes the court to 
enter a satisfaction order upon motion and proof. These 
requirements were met here (R-699-703) . Both Rule 2.9 of 
the Rules of Practice and Rule 4 of the Third District 
Rules allow entry of orders such as this without notice to 
all parties when the court so order. Thus, the District 
Court acted well within authorized limits in entering the 
satisfaction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the briefs of respon-
dents, the Court should affirm the Amended Judgment of the 
District court dated June 23, 1986, dismiss defendants' 
claim for attorney's fees from Great Equity, and uphold 
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the satisfaction of judgiaent entered by the District 
court. 
DATED this /o^ day of January, 1987. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
r
^ t y ^ ^ ^ ^ e^c^ 
iam jrTlansen "^ 
Robert K. Hilder 
Attorneys for Great Equity Life 
Insurance Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
were mailed, postage prepaid, this _day of January, 
1987, to each of the following: 
Jay V. Barney, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Mark S. Miner, Esq. 
Attorney for defendants 
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBITS 
Exhibit A: Documents of Tender on November 7, 1983 
Letter from Mr. Hansen to Mssrs. Barney 
and Miner, dated November 7, 1983 (R-647) 
Copy of check from Great Equity to GMAC 
and defendants for principal and interest 
in the sum of $6,135.36, dated October 18, 
1983 and attached to above letter of 
November 7, 1983 (R-648) 
Copy of check from Great Equity to 
defendants for costs in the sum of 
$7 42.85, dated October 13, 1983, and 
attached to above letter of November 7, 
1983 (R-652) 
Exhibit B: 
Exhibit C: 
Letter from Mr. Barney to Mr. Hansen, cc. 
Mr. Miner, dated November 28, 1984, 
indicating return of the check for 
$6,135.36 following attempts by Mr. Barney 
to have Mr. Miner accept the check (R-650) 
Letter from Mr. Barney to Mr. Miner, 
dated November 16, 1983, attempting to 
effectuate tender of the check for 
$6,135.36 from Great Equity and indictat-
ing the willingness of GMAC and Great 
Equity to accept Mr. Miners's signature of 
the satisfaction of judgment subject 
to defendants' then-pending issues on 
appeal. This letter is pending submission 
to the record. 
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RAY R.CHRtSTENSEN 
JAY £. JENSEN 
ELWOOO P. POWELL 
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN OALE J. LAMBERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TOOO S.WINEGAR 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM J . HANSEN 
M DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIP S. FERGUSON 
RICHARD C- RIFE 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
BRYAN A. LARSON 
JAN P. MALMBERG 
LAW O F F I C E S 
C H R I S T E N S E N , J E N S E N & POWELL 
9 0 0 KEARNS BUILDING 
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH SAIOI 
November 7, 1983 
E. R.CHRISTENSEN 
(1886-1979) 
TELEPHONE 3 5 5 - 3 * 3 1 
AREA CODE 801 
Jay V. Barney, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Mark S. Miner, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: GMAC v. Hector Martinez - Great Equity Life, et al. 
Dear Gentlemen: 
I have enclosed a check to Jay in the amount of $6,135.36 
made payable to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and their attorney 
Mark Miner and GMAC and its attorney Jay Barney, and have also 
enclosed a check to Mark in the amount of $742.85 made out to 
Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and their attorney Mark S. Miner. 
In addition, I have forwarded the original release to 
Jay for the signature of his client, after which I would appreciat 
it if he would forward the same to Mark in order to obtain the 
signature of his client. 
Also, the negotiation of the settlement check is conditior 
upon receiving a satisfaction of judgment from Mr. Miner. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Yours truly, 
William J. Hansen 
WJH:kp 
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November 28, 1984 
Mr. William J. Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
Christensen, Jensen 6 Powell 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Bill: 
enclosed please find your check which you forwarded to us in 
November 1983 for payment off Great Equity's obligation under the 
case of GMAC - Martinez - Great equity Llfg inaucJULe Cuuijjauy.— 
Efforts were made to have Mr» Miner and his clients execute 
the check that the question off principal and interest accrued 
aiqht be resolved to cufc oft: the liability 6ff yaug Cliaflte This 
the defendants have declined to do. 
Inasmuch as the check is now stale, and no cooperation is 
forthcoming from the defendants, GMAC is unable to apply the 
proceeds to cut off its claims* 
In a recent conversation with Jeffff Barnum, Utah Supreme 
Court Clerk, it appears that it will be several weeks before a 
hearing may be held in this case. 
Thank you Cor your cooperation* It is unfortunate that we 
were unable to make this resolution* It would appear, iff GMAC 
prevails in the next case aa it has in the past, in our opinion, 
the defendants may be liable for further attorney's fees and 
accumulated interest as a consequence of their refusal to endorse 
this check to satisfy the obligation to GMAC* 
Sincerely, 
JVB/bb 
Enc« 
cc* Mark S, Miner, Bsq* 
CopYTocu&tr 
Sjty VU Barney # 
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November 16, 1983 
Mr. Mark Miner 
Attorney at Law 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: GMAC v. Hector Martinez v. Great Equity Life 
Dear Mark: 
Recently we received a check in the sum of $*>, 135.36, 
payable by great Equity Lite Insurance Company to "HECTOR 
HAAflMBZ, MANUEL RIVERA, i THBJCR ATT?V MAAk MINER & GMAC & ITS 
'Affv, JAy BARNsyy ~" 
This check represents the accumulated interest and principal 
due and owing under the judgment up to mid-October, 198J. "~ 
GMAC is willing to receive this check in satisfaction of its 
debt and obligation and terminate interest as of October lb, 
1983. provided that the check is endorsee py your clients and 
yourself and returned to GMAC to sacisry ica claim-
GMAC does not, however, release its claim and rights to 
attorney's fees. 
Mr* Hansen had sent a release document that appeared to be a 
general release to be signed by the parties. I contacted Mr. 
Hansen on November 11th to discuss the same. I advised that you 
were appealing the question of attorney^ fees to the Utah 
Supreme Court relative to the obligation of Great Equity Life to 
reimburse your client for attorney's fees and to pay the attor-
ney's fees claimed by GMAC against your client. , I advised Mr. 
Hansen that we would not be in a position to execute any release 
without reserving these rights. Bill has indicated tnat ne wouic 
have no objection to drawing "a release that would satisfy the 
principal and Interest due and owing under the contract to 
general Motors Acceptance Corporation and rmsMOia-XJie-j^ZES^ . 
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Would you kindly advise whether such a procedure would be 
acceptable to you and your clients* In the event we cannot come 
to an immediate resolution of the case, then your clients must 
understand that they will continue to be responsible for accruing 
interest under the judgment entered against them. 
It would appear that we should be able to resolve the issue 
concerning principal and interest without violating your client's 
claims for attorney's fees nor the claims o£ GMAC witn respect fco 
its attorney's fees claim* 
Please advise as to your position* 
Sincerely, 
DAY, BAHNEY 6 TYCKSEN 
JVB/bb 
cc: William J* Hansen, Esq* 
Mr. Art Beery, GMAC 
f ^ayo/f. Barney fj 
